

Partnership of the European Commission and the Council of Europe

European Youth Centre, Budapest
23-25 November 2006

Paper presented at the Research Seminar “Young People and Active Citizenship”

European Citizenship between Patriotic Sentiments and Universal Rights

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...for he who has a right to a share in the judicial and executive part of government in any city, him we call a citizen of that place; and a city, in one word, is a collective body of such persons sufficient in themselves to all the purposes of life.

Aristotle: Politics (1275b)

I am a citizen of the world.

Diogenes the Cynic (rumoured)

A statement attributed to Jacques Delors, “no one falls in love with a common market”¹, allows for opening this paper’s topical area. Do we require a sentiment such as *love* in order to further civic commitment, active participation and an internalisation of European values beyond the common market? Isn’t love a stance that is reserved for outdated notions of how individuals relate to their overarching polity, i.e. patriotic feeling towards the nation-state?

In this paper I suggest that the perennial debate in political philosophy on potential virtues and dangers of patriotism can inform the approach towards the concept of European citizenship in civic education. The alleged benefit of non-exclusive forms of patriotism lies in their potential for rendering civic values tangible to young people and for conveying a sense of their immediacy by drawing on principles, (hi)stories and role models present in the respective national contexts (see MacIntyre 1995, Galston 1991). On the opposite side, philosophers point out the danger of any kind of patriotic attachment, namely controverting the goal of what civic education should be aiming at: grounding active participation in a critical spirit and non-particular (i.e. universal) values, such as human rights.²

This contrast proves to be instructive for a discussion of European citizenship. Contemporary approaches towards this concept are situated in between, on the one side, notions of universal values and, on the opposite, the reference to shared identities predominantly conceived of through cultural affinities (see Habermas 1995, Weiler 1997,

¹ As cited by EU Commissioner Péter Balázs, 27.09.2004, <http://europa.eu/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?reference=SPEECH/04/421&format=HTML&aged=1&language=EN&guiLanguage=en>

² See, for example the vivid case made by Martha Nussbaum (1996), or the works of educationalist Eamon Callan (1994)

Shore 2004). In this manner, the question on the direction citizenship education should pursue in the European context, is one that can be framed in terms of the debate on patriotism: do we convey civic values by reference to shared cultural, historical or religious characteristics, should we make use of the symbolic resources provided by those commonalities and aim for sentimental/emotional attachment with Europe conceived of as a cultural/historical/religious community? Or do we refrain from doing so and promote universal values by way of reference to a canon of universal rights extending beyond the particularities of culture/history/religion? In this paper, I will conceptualise these alternatives and explore possible places of European citizenship in between the poles of patriotic-particularist duties and cosmopolitan-universal commitment.

First, I will situate my paper in between broader “strategic” choices of political philosophy. *Second*, I will proceed by situating European citizenship within discussions among adherents of cosmopolitan thought, on the one side, and, *third*, theorists striving for a rehabilitation of patriotism, on the other. *Fourth*, I will weigh up the choices and consider the possible position of citizenship education in between civic passion arising from identification with particularities of Europe and universal morality. *Finally*, I will argue for a version of a “bicameral orientation”, which combines deep normative commitments to the particular with a pluralist spirit and the readiness for open conversations. This stance, powerfully formulated by William Connolly (2005), might allow for forms of civic education that inspire enthusiastic engagement whilst retaining openness beyond communal boundaries.

1 Two Languages of Political Philosophy

Two approaches towards, in general, political concepts and, in particular, notions of citizenship are at hand. *First*, normative theorising is mostly concerned with giving judgment on the practical implications of prevalent forms of citizenship, be it the inclusion of outsiders, the consequences of liberal against republican notions of citizenship for how individuals relate to their polity, or, for example, an investigation into “good” or “bad” foreign policies looked upon as emerging from a national sense-of-mission, which crystallizes in particular practices of citizenship. *Second*, we may subscribe to an approach that is largely concerned with the deconstruction of concepts such as citizenship. With critical theories³ increasingly incorporated into the scholarly canon, the claims of concepts such as “the nation,” “the state,” “community” and “citizenship” have been questioned and often enough found wanting. State, nation, community and notions of citizenship, which connect the former with the political life of individual persons, have undergone efforts to be stripped of their naturalist pretence. In the literature on the formations of nation states (Anderson 1983, Tilly 1990) the reconstruction of historical occurrences can point out the particular constellations that brought into existence nations as we know them. Moreover, scholarly work on the emergence of nationalism (e.g. Gellner 1983, Brubaker 1996) has pointed out the functional logic of nationalisms in the creation of the nation-state such as its purpose for the actualisation and reaffirmation of states’ claims to sovereignty and its significance in the mobilisation of people spread out over large-scale territories. Accordingly, state, nation and community are more and more regarded to be entities not outside the range of individual and collective agency. They are seen to emerge from the interplay of social forces, structural determinants, individual and collective action. This historicizing venture defamiliarises political entities that have come to acquire quasi-natural status in the course of their employment.

³ With ‘critical’ I am referring here to the wide range of “postmodern”, “poststructuralist” and “critical theorist” attempts to tackle the predominant paradigms in social theory: the positivist concern with stable units of analysis, actors’ fixed interests and the corollary disregard for believes, ideas, discourses and historical depth.

The separation between normative theory and deconstruction, however, appears unsatisfactory when aiming for sophisticated analysis and normative deliberation at the same time. The deconstructive pathway may show disregard for how people actually live in respective social and cultural contexts, which we do not *prima facie* consider to be constructed, but which we encounter as an immediate and objective social reality. A strict normative language code, on the other hand, may disregard the contingency of our social context, its historical specificity and alternative ways of living which we might have lost sight of. Thus, normative political theorising needs to account for the unsettling option of deconstruction whilst acknowledging that the moral choices and obligations we encounter appear over and above real, felt and experienced.

A question that brings together both codes of language for making sense of citizenship may proceed as follows: *What kind of citizenship should we be constructing in order to build the kind of community we desire to live in?* Somewhat naively, this question rejects reified notions of community and approaches communities as something in-the-making. Whilst this idea of a manipulability of individual-community relations is certainly not universally warranted, the approach involves a normative commitment to the value of individual decisions in the creation of desirable communities. It involves a deconstructive move away from sedimented traditions, objectified social relations and the naturalist pretence of settled communities towards an emphasis on the construction of the ‘good’ community, however it may look like.

This move does not deny the situatedness of human agency within cultural contexts as it has been argued frequently.⁴ Among others, Charles Taylor (1989) argues that culture provides the building blocks that make individual agency possible in the first place. It is noteworthy, however, that Taylor does not deny the constructed character of culture. Culture provides the background against which we may make individual value judgments and strive to

⁴ See Gadamer 2004, Ricoeur 1981.

lead our lives according to an idea of “the good”. Acknowledging this import of moral deliberation, however, does not circumvent the deconstructive effort. On the contrary, moral judgment is enriched by deconstructive project as it may point out other possible worlds we may hardly be considering when only taking account of the world (and our historical epoch) as it is.

These brief thoughts on possible approaches towards concepts in political philosophy indicate the somewhat intricate area of this paper. Its aim is to investigate the concrete and real content of ideas, such as cosmopolitan values, civic commitment, patriotic sentiment, which, looked upon from the deconstructive perspective, are anything but real. Notwithstanding, their reality for moral agency needs to be taken into account in order to lead the discussion on how values should be realised in the construction of desirable political communities.

2 Cosmopolitanism and the Universal Aspiration

Cosmopolitanism, according to Thomas Pogge, involves the three commitments to individualism, universality and generality (Pogge 1992: 48). Rather than departing from an emphasis on the nation state or distinct groups (be it families, ethnic, religious or national communities) it singles out the individual human being as its primary object of concern. Universality refers to the equality of this concern focusing on humankind as such and going beyond its subdivisions into cultural, religious or gendered sub-groups. This kind of generality, according to Pogge, refers to the force of its claim directed not towards marked-off groups but towards normative judgment and according obligations of anyone for everybody.⁵ In addition, cosmopolitans generally realize that these ideals may come into conflict with the subdivision of the world into distinct groups, states, nations and the like. In this manner, in

⁵ I contend further down that this kind of normative theorising is not exclusive to cosmopolitan thought but seems to be the characteristic of any kind of liberal morality that administers moral judgment from an impartial standpoint with the claim to universal validity.

Roman Stoicism we can witness the discussion between the obligations towards the state and the overriding obligation to the good of humanity.⁶ Whilst cosmopolitan thought in its various historical shapes cannot be read to be without ambiguity on this point, it seems, however, that it is united by the ideal of a polity that unites all humans beyond the contingent boundaries of nation states.

The cosmopolitan ideas form part of an age-old branch of political theorising united by the purpose of transcending the allegedly contingent boundaries of particular groups. Stoicism in the Roman world (see Hadas 1943, Hill 2000), the theological thought of Augustine's *Civitas Dei*, and the universalism of Immanuel Kant's *Perpetual Peace*⁷ exhibit this commonality of providing a universal moral theory which explicitly aims at overcoming the significance of boundaries for normative judgment (or at least at establishing a second domain of moral judgment of overarching importance to the particularity of life in the community), and thus for establishing obligations towards the communal "outsider".⁸ A contemporary revival of cosmopolitan lines of thought is connected to a concern with global justice in the light of, on the one side, poverty-struck and war-torn regions in the Third World, and, on the other, affluence and peace in the West. In particular, Charles Beitz has taken up cosmopolitan ideals in order to substantiate his call for global commitment in sometimes painstaking justifications of universal obligations in the light of national boundaries, limited resources and recurrent unwillingness to help and intervene on behalf of others (Beitz 1979, 1989, Beitz/Alexander 1985).⁹

⁶ This conflict between *republicae* and *cosmopolis* is an intricate one in Stoic thought. Generally, allegiance to the nation state is not seen to preclude the idea of world citizenship – which, at times, seems to function more as a corrective ideal than as a concrete political vision.

⁷ "Since the narrower or wider community of the peoples of the earth has developed so far that a violation of rights in one place is felt throughout the world, the idea of a law of world citizenship is no high-flown or exaggerated notion. It is a supplement to the unwritten code of the civil and international law, indispensable for the maintenance of the public human rights and hence also perpetual peace." (Kant 1795/1963: 105)

⁸ Much could be said on the lack of credibility of many cosmopolitan claims in the light of Stoic justification of slavery or outrages committed in the name of the Catholic Church (consider here, for example, that Augustine limits access to the *City of God* to true believers). What I am concerned here, however, is merely a type of moral argument and not the consistence of its practical application.

⁹ See Thomas Nagel here on problems with egalitarian conceptions of justice (2005).

In a more recent attempt, Martha Nussbaum introduces a set of cosmopolitan ideals (with particular emphasis on the direction civic education should pursue). Building on the image of concentric circles of obligation, she goes on to adopt an inclusive view, which, reminiscent of the principle of universal generality, rejects proximity as the governing principle for obligations. Nussbaum contends that

we should .. work to make all human beings part of our community of dialogue and concern, base our political deliberations on that interlocking commonality, and give the circle that defines our humanity special attention and respect. (1996: 9)

Shared nationality, as a “morally irrelevant characteristic” (1996: 5), cannot serve as an excuse for the abrogation of obligations towards those in more distant circles. The principles of common humanity and world citizenship, indeed, require an equal distribution of concern. Nussbaum acknowledges that certain obligations may be better served within narrow circles, such as the upbringing of children by their natural parents, but regarding national groups, ethnic or religious communities or states, she points out their moral insignificance in the light of allegiances to humanity preceding any particular and accidental sense of belonging.

The common feature of cosmopolitan argument is its representation of communal boundaries as insignificant in terms of moral importance and arising obligations. Whilst the occurrence of one’s birth in a specific cultural or political horizon can only be regarded to be an accident, other theorists, however, cast doubt on the Nussbaum’s inference and argue that even accidental occurrences may obtain fundamental moral weight.

3 (a) Critics of Cosmopolitanism: The Principle Value of Culture

The cosmopolitan claim on the moral insignificance of national or communal boundaries has been disputed. Whilst the normative thrust of cosmopolitan thought is generally considered sympathetically (and sometimes in a patronising way)¹⁰, it has been argued that certain

¹⁰ See for example Thomas Nagel’s argument, which considers and rejects the *institutional consequences* required to achieve global equality (Nagel 2005).

spheres of commitment need to be established in order to arrive at a morality that appears to fit to what human beings are like. In this manner, the argument of proponents of the moral significance of boundaries generally proffers some anthropological undergirding for their reasoning. Emphasis is put on the relevance of cultural contexts for the constitution of individual agency and identity. Human beings, according to one line of argument, require a “standpoint in the somewhere” in contrast to the allegedly detached perspective of cosmopolitanisms’ “standpoint in the nowhere”.¹¹ Human beings are situated in concrete social and cultural contexts; addressing moral agents requires acknowledging the specificity of the context in which agents are being constituted. In this manner, Charles Taylor provides two types of argument, which can be read as attempts to rehabilitate the moral significance of boundaries.

First, in order to uphold democratic modes of political organisations, always a complex and arduous task, civic commitment is a requirement. Civic commitment, however, can only be incited when community members attribute some fundamental importance to their community. Taylor argues that this kind of participation “requires not only a commitment to a common project, but also a special sense of bonding among the people working together” (Taylor 1996: 120). Patriotism, Taylor argues, may instil this bonding.

Taylor’s second line of argument is a somewhat less functional (but more complex) part of his reconstruction of the connection between the formation of individual identities with conceptions of “the good” and poses a severe challenge to the cosmopolitan principle of individualism (as laid out above). Cultural contexts, Taylor argues, figure as the background frame against which individual value judgments become possible. In order to arrive at ideas of “the desirable” and “the valuable” human beings draw on practices and understandings of the cultural background they grow up in. Even the attempt to dissociate oneself from one’s

¹¹ I will not overstrain this often-used metaphor as it is unhappily reminiscent of the familiar anti-Semitic metaphor of “rootless cosmopolitan”.

upbringing, cultural heritage and so on, obtains meaning and only becomes an individual moral choice, against the cultural practices it dissociates itself from. Moreover, the inextricable situatedness of individual human beings in cultural contexts makes “good life” only attainable, when the context as such may become the potential object of esteem (Taylor 1995). This argument certainly does not function as a description of current state-of-affairs, but as a prescription, recipe or reform model for how individuals may lead good lives in good communities – which might still need to be constructed.

Moreover, Michael Walzer casts doubt on the notion of world citizenship Nussbaum operates with.

I'm am not even aware that there is a world such that one could be a citizen of it. No one has offered me citizenship, or described the naturalization process, or enlisted me in the world's institutional structures, or given me an account of its decision procedures (I hope they are democratic), or provided me with a list of the benefits and obligations of citizenship, or shown me the world's calendar and the common celebrations and commemorations of its citizens. (Walzer 1996: 125)

Taken together with the previous concerns voiced by Charles Taylor, Walzer's argument, first, amounts to the complaint on the lack of proper institutionalisation of anything remotely reminiscent of a world polity. Equally important, however, appears the reference to the lack of common celebrations and commemorative events. Put differently, Walzer appears concerned with the lack of cultural material he considers to be indispensable part of what being a citizen is. He is concerned with the lack of symbolic resources that are available for the utopian world polity. The hollowness of world citizenship does not provide any ground material for identification and Walzer seems to find it hard to believe that anybody could arrive at a sense of obligation and commitment without such symbolic resources available. This argument on the necessity symbolic resources for civic commitment points towards alternative resolutions that put emphasis on thick cultural and historic backgrounds as a prerequisite for civic commitment.

3 (b) Patriotism: The Principle Value of Proximity

A disclaimer appears due before engaging with concepts of patriotism. What we are dealing with here are moderate forms of patriotism, i.e. notions of patriotism that show sensitivity to the potential perversions of xenophobia and racism. The concept, however, is intricate to approach and there is neither a settled understanding nor an unequivocally acknowledged demarcation between patriotism and its, it seems, “evil” twin: *nationalism*. Some have argued that the key difference between the two consists in nationalism’s inclination to postulate the superiority of one’s nation (in contrast to patriotism’s lack of comparative desires of such kind) and then infer some form of claim to political dominance. Whilst this distinction is hard to corroborate on the ground¹², it may make sense to bracket nationalism from the debate and focus on what are said to be the distinguishing marks of the ‘moderate’ patriotism we are dealing with.¹³ Patriotism is characterised, as Igor Primoratz has argued convincingly, by

a certain type of concern for one’s country and compatriots. It is *special* concern for their interests, their welfare: a stronger and deeper concern than the concern one has for all other human beings. (Primoratz 2002: 444, emphasis in original)¹⁴

Worth mentioning, that from this point of view the concept of a *critical patriotism* loses its persuasiveness. Whether “love of one’s country” allows a critical distance towards one’s nation-state certainly is an important question to answer; if patriotism, however, is essentially defined by creating a sphere of particular obligation and by charging territorial boundaries with moral significance, even critical distance towards the shortcomings of one’s community does not diminish this hierarchisation of obligations according to the principle of proximity.

¹² Consider the value-laden uses of the labels “patriotic” (mostly as a positive self-description) and “nationalist” (mostly as a negative attribution). Stephen Nathanson (1993: 185) argues that the distinction is all the harder as there are illiberal and liberal understandings of both concepts.

¹³ As an entertaining side note: consider the dispute on the English version of wikipedia on the current entry on patriotism (<http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Talk:Patriotism>): whilst some of the clashes there appear due to the ambiguity of the concept in terms of different usages, one can here obtain a vivid overview of passionate defences of the concept and corresponding attacks.

¹⁴ Primoratz, however, then goes on to argue that his “moderate” understanding of nationalism does not fall prey to undue privileges for compatriots. Having a “measure of concern” (2002: 457) for others beyond the nation-state is tantamount to not having equal concern to everybody. His argument remains incomprehensible to me at this point.

Having already dealt with the critical rendering of this assumption of particular spheres of attachment and obligation (by Nussbaum), we shall now investigate Alasdair MacIntyre's reasoning on the virtue of patriotism. Rather than employing simple conceptual analysis and then sifting through pros and cons of patriotic sentiment, MacIntyre takes the concept as a motive to question some fundamental issues of moral theorising. The issue of patriotism challenges the conception of *neutral* moral points-of-view from which to pass judgment on particular issues according to *universal* standards. Patriotism's claim discards this standpoint. In important cases (MacIntyre refers here to the question of the distribution of vital resources and aggressive foreign policies/war making against outside communities) patriotism's claim might not coincide with the demands of universal morality. Against this notion of the universal, individual and general claims of morality, patriotism leads MacIntyre to consider a version of morality that puts fundamental importance on the question "where and from whom I learn my morality". This version, important to mention, he does not endorse (indeed, MacIntyre offers no answer to his initial question "Is patriotism a virtue?"¹⁵). It serves, however, as a contrast foil against which to point out the shortcomings of liberal moral theory.

Detached from my community, I will be apt to lose my hold upon all genuine standards of judgment. Loyalty to that community, to the hierarchy of particular kinship, particular local community and particular natural community, is... [thus] a prerequisite for morality. So patriotism and those loyalties cognate to it are not just virtues but central virtues. (MacIntyre 1984: 11)

Recalling the argument of Charles Taylor, we can discern, however, one notable difference. Whilst communal culture, in Taylor's account, constitutes the building blocks, which we can avail ourselves to determine our own life choices, the "morality of patriotism" in MacIntyre's wording, figures as a determinant for individual choices. It seems that, whilst Taylor proposes the value of cultural contexts for individual moral choices, MacIntyre's representation rejects individual moral choices that exceed communal.

¹⁵ In his *After Virtue*, however, MacIntyre exhibits a clear affinity towards a form of ethics that is closer to the morality of patriotism than to liberal conceptions (MacIntyre 1984).

The danger with this kind of moralising (besides its fundamental incommensurability with liberal morality), it seems, lies in falling for a reified view of culture understood as something that inevitably, absolutely and inextricably determines our viable conceptions of “the good”, rather than allowing for the necessary (but superable) conditionality of our conceptions of the good on cultural “building blocks”. Thus, a middle ground between culturalist determination and free-floating liberalism appears warranted.

4 (a) Derivatives of Cosmopolitan and Patriotic Morality

At this point, I will not be concerned with a further evaluation of the normative claims of both the cosmopolitan and the patriotic argument. The two, however, figure as prototypes of reasoning either questioning or putting emphasis on territorial boundaries as a significant variable in moral arguments. Both types, I will point out here, are seldom encountered in pure forms. Elements of their claims and derivatives, however, are at hand in almost every invocation of citizenship and talk on the nature of individual/community relations.

Elements of cosmopolitan judgment are closely related to many other forms of moral universalism. The universality of human rights bears a claim that exceeds boundaries; enlightenment ideals ascribe rationality and a potential of emancipation to *every* human being. Value commitments that start from these ideals are usually charged with cosmopolitan undertones. As MacIntyre rightly points out, the principles of universality, generality and individuality prevail in contemporary modes of moral reasoning. Moreover, keeping in mind the cosmopolitan (regulative) ideal of a world state, it comes as no surprise that passionate proponents of human rights generally stand up for strong international institutions and advocate scaling down the sovereignty of the nation state.

This, however, is not to deny the significance of the patriotic point-of-view. In the image of outwardly diminishing circles of obligation, there lies a pragmatic element of patriotic

morality, which ascribes *special status* to insiders, e.g. those with closer proximity to the centre. The pragmatism of contemporary policy-making, for example the decreasing amounts of foreign aid justified with the need to spend resources on domestic problems, point towards the prevalence of pragmatic elements of patriotic argument.

It seems, we are confronted with a mix of cosmopolitan universality and patriotic particularity in our moral choices and in the choices made on our behalf by political actors. Rather than radically separating the two from a conceptual point-of-view, at this point I will try to retrace their persistence in thinking on what European citizenship is and should be like. My main hypothesis here is that morality is something that is being *felt*. When we want to appeal to certain types of moral behaviour and obligation in people, we, thus, need to be aware of this general position of morality in broader modes of feeling, thinking and being. For conveying civic values and obligations towards young people, in particular, we need to keep in mind how these notions fit into the experienced and felt life-world of those we are talking about. Citizenship, in this manner, gives evidence of a specific resolution of individual-community a relation that is inseparable from fundamental moral choices: obligations arising from the particularities of distinct polities and commitment stemming from the call of universal ideals.

4 (b) European Citizenship in-between two poles

Let us now consider the intricate situation we find ourselves in when making sense of European citizenship. Understandings of citizenship, indicating political resolutions of individual-community-relations, bear witness of specific kinds of morality afforded (or seen to be prevalent) in the particular community. Whilst they may testify to a strong sense of obligation towards a nation state, the contemporary situation within Europe asks us riddles as to what kind of sense of obligation and commitment may come along with being a citizen of

Europe. Unsurprisingly, the most formidable challenge here is the peculiar status of the European polity – be it something completely different from what nation-states are or an attempt in mimicry. The preceding paragraphs, however, serve to pin down two alternative poles for how to make sense of Europe as a polity with according demands to moral responsibilities, obligations towards others within and outside of that polity and the arising call for political/social engagement and active citizenship.¹⁶

On the one hand, we can witness attempts towards a framing of Europe in terms of symbolic resources that were previously regarded to be exclusive to the domain of nation-states. Besides the incremental institutionalisation of the European polity, a European currency has been introduced, European symbols invented¹⁷, and the European Union even seems to develop forms of a founding myth¹⁸, which may one day even take a shape similar to the grand narratives that are being told about the emergence of individual nation states.¹⁹ Whilst it is not the point here to argue whether these trends are desirable (as an imitation of nation states), we can still ascertain the significance of these attempts inasmuch as they are aiming at the introduction of something *new*, the framing of Europe as an entity one can be loyal to, one can refer to in one's self-descriptions, one can relate to as something that provides oneself with a cultural identity and, particularly interesting, as something that

¹⁶ Weiler (1997) has put forward a strong argument on the non-applicability of the term “citizenship” on Europe. Weiler against concentric circles – Europe has a different status, multiple demoi

¹⁷ Commission's statement: “Symbols play a key role in consciousness-raising, but there is also a need to make the European citizen aware of the different elements that go to make up his European identity, of our cultural unity with all its diversity of expression, and of the historic ties which links the nations of Europe.” (CEC 1988, Bulletin of EC, Supplement 2/88).

¹⁸ On significance & function of myths compare the presentation by Tamara Ehs at this seminar.

¹⁹ This founding story, which is certainly not as settled as national narratives, may take up the motif of peace after WW2, the historical accords made between previously antagonist peoples and leaders, or, as recent elements, the struggles in setting up a constitution. Whilst this argument appears somewhat odd at this stage of the European unification process, it is by no means the case that bureaucratic and technocratic arrangements never before received a symbolic rendering. For a similar line of thought compare Benedict Anderson's account of how contingent bureaucratic decisions are afforded symbolic status and, thus, obtain relevance beyond the bureaucratic act itself (Anderson picks up the emergence of nation states in Latin America). Anthony Smith (1992), however, argues on the contrary that “[w]hen it comes to the ritual and ceremony of collective identification, there is no European equivalent of national or religious community. Any research into the question of forging, or even discovering, a possible European identity cannot afford to overlook these central issues.”

allocates obligations demanding active participation. Casting this development in terms of the moral options I have sketched out above, we may argue that this direction is aimed at the creation of a European patriotic project, the attempt to create a particular European standpoint of moral judgment. Indeed, recent attempts to fill European citizenship with sense have explicitly offered this kind of reasoning. Thus, for example for some French participants in the debate, the question is not anymore whether we *should*, but how *could* we create a genuine European patriotism.²⁰ It is not the point of this paper, to investigate more deeply into the motifs of these interventions. To speculate, however, it seems that there is some form of anxiety about Europe's universal aspirations (and its open-ended integration process), which is regarded to be too big a task when striving for truly workable supranational institutions should be the primary goal. One contribution by the Belgian MEP Gérard Deprez and Domenico Rossetti di Valdalbero provides an account of this appeal to the concept of patriotism:

La relance de l'intégration européenne, déjà à Quinze mais encore plus à Vingt-cinq, passe par le développement d'un patriotisme européen. Inspiré des valeurs universalistes de l'Europe, loin d'être enfermé sur lui-même, ce patriotisme sera ouvert sur le monde.²¹

Here, we may ask what the meaningful content of patriotism might be when characterised by unlimited openness. Indeed, the speakers aim at taking the best of two worlds – aiming for the establishment of a sphere of particular attachment whilst negating the normative consequences arising and insisting on the ideals of moral universalism. A more consistent account is provided by Dominique de Villepin, whose intervention aims at creating a kind of economic patriotism.

[L]'Europe doit mieux défendre les intérêts de ses citoyens et de ses entreprises. Et c'est pour cela, même si le terme est parfois mal compris,

²⁰ See the interventions by Valéry Giscard d'Estaing whose call for European patriotism is also connected to the demand of setting up clear boundaries for any future expansion of the EU (http://www.revuedesdeuxmondes.fr/francais/actuellement_dec2004.htm).

²¹ Own translation : The resumption of European integration, already at the stage of 15 but even more at 25, depends upon the establishment of a European patriotism. Inspired by the universal values of Europe, far from being confined to itself, this patriotism would be open to all the world. (http://www.uef.be/uef_v2_joomla/index2.php?option=com_content&do_pdf=1&id=20)

que j'insiste sur la nécessité d'un véritable patriotisme européen : il ne s'agit pas de se replier derrière un protectionnisme qui est bien sûr dépassé. Il s'agit au contraire de rassembler nos forces, d'unir nos efforts pour aller dans le même sens et affirmer sans faiblesse nos intérêts dans le monde.²²

Even though the speaker withdraws from the undesirable isolationist stance he appears to associate with patriotism, here it becomes clearer that patriotism is not about embracing the world, but about safeguarding interests, or, put differently, about reassuring oneself about the addressees of one's moral obligations. The noteworthy attempt is to create a particular European standpoint as a prerequisite for living up to responsibilities for the people living in Europe (oddly enough, you might want to think that normally this moral standpoint *precedes* the establishment of European interests).

So far we could (remarkably enough) be witnessing the birth of a new nation state in which symbolic resources are adjusted in order to arrive at a degree of social cohesion and commitment. The peculiarity of this attempt, however, is the strong status universal ideas are being afforded.²³ Indeed, we may as well read the European project as an attempt in the creation of a universal standpoint, exporting stability, human rights and peace beyond its borders. The construction of the European Convention on Human Rights, the jurisdiction of the European Court of Human Rights, and also statements from the side of the Council of Europe and the Union give evidence of some set of universal responsibilities which apparently stem from a felt obligation not only to European peoples but towards the whole world. The European project is to a considerable extent about a universal sense-of-mission.

²² Own translation: Europe needs to perform better in defending its interests and the ones of its citizens and enterprises. That's why, even if the term is sometimes misunderstood, that I insist on the need to create a genuine European patriotism: this is not about to draw back behind an antiquated protectionism. On the contrary, it is about uniting our forces and our efforts and to pursue the same direction and to affirm our interests in the world without weakness. (http://www.sig.premier-ministre.gouv.fr/acteurs/interventions-premier-ministre_9/discours_498/discours-dominique-villepin-universite_55148.html)

²³ Certainly, also nation states exhibit elements of universal lines of argument. Consider, one example among many, the *mission civilisatrice*, the idea that the moral superiority of French Enlightenment ideals qualified the 18th and 19th century French nation state to assume trusteeship over less (morally) developed nations. Or the recently adopted Belgian War Crimes Statute and Germany's new international criminal code, which both assume (theoretically) judicial authority over crimes against community committed elsewhere on the globe.

These two poles, the markedly universalist aspirations of the European project and the recurrent attempts to create a particular European standpoint, mark each side in between which we can try to make sense of what European citizenship might be.

5 Conclusion: The Uneasy Choices of Citizenship Education

David Archard remarks that citizenship education might encounter a paradox.

The liberal polity, if it is to survive, requires that its citizens patriotically identify with one another and with the project which that polity represents. Yet, if we teach patriotism civic education betrays the ideals which, arguably, are constitutive of any proper education, chiefly a commitment to the standards of critical reason. (Archard 1999: 167)

Archard eventually challenges the phrasing of the paradox by putting emphasis on the necessary position of critical thought within the historically specific background of the nation state. In this final part, I will briefly lay out a complementary vision introduced by William Connolly that might help to include strong commitments and particular beliefs with the universal aspirations of cosmopolitanism. Connolly, in his recent book *Pluralism* (2005), argues for what he calls a “bicameral orientation” (2005: 5), which involves both the deep commitment to the particular point-of-view and the acknowledgment that there is a plurality of such commitments in the world we live in. The question we need to answer in order to create commitment and active citizenship is

how to enliven the dispositions through which perception is colored, concepts are formed, evidence is sifted, interpretation is engaged, arguments are inflected, and faith is consolidated. (2005: 161)

This is most notably not a secular standpoint, but one that allows for strong beliefs such as in the particular value of one’s most inner circles of obligation. Connolly’s call, however, whilst aiming for the kind of passion and colourful faith – what he calls the *vertical* dimension of personal commitments – is to keep in mind the horizontal plurality of strong beliefs, judgments and moral points-of-view. Thus, patriotic morality might be affordable as long as it negotiates its claims with the cognition that it cannot be an aggressively unifying project. A

“standpoint in the somewhere” (and this “somewhere” being Europe) is required; it should come along, however, as one of the many possibilities people possess in order to make sense of their lives and commitments. It should, I suggest, not make the mistakes of the nation state and opt for the coercive imposition of its identity claims.

There might be a wide range of ways for how to resolve the tension between universal and patriotic morality.²⁴ It has not been the intention of the paper to evaluate how successful proposed solutions may be in finding a viable ground between patriotic and cosmopolitan morality. The thesis offered in this paper, however, is that active citizenship requires deep commitments and a corollary moral standpoint that serves as a pivotal point in order to ground this commitment. In order for Europe to provide this kind of standpoint, we do not necessarily need to be mimicking the institutions and symbolic resources provided by the nation state. Having said that, I contend, it will not be sufficient to maintain a detached and merely evaluative stance if we want to create commitment for the European polity. Borders may be charged with symbolic significance; symbols may be created and narratives established that facilitate assuming a committed European point-of-view. Values may be grounded in the specificities of European history and culture (necessarily something constructed). Thus, passionate and active citizenship might arise, which – on the other hand – needs to be aware on the availability of other sources of passionate identification.

In the beginning, I have laid out the question: *What kind of citizenship should we be constructing in order to build the kind of community we desire to live in?* This I take not to be a question teachers of civic education need to answer *before* engaging with young people. On the contrary, the goal of civic education might be to pose this question together with the people one is working with. How to accommodate strong commitments to particular communities and how to draw on emotional attachments in order to arrive at active

²⁴ Compare Habermas’ cosmopolitan constitutional patriotism. For a discussion of some attempts to resolve the tension see Canovan (2000).

participation is a question, I contend, that needs to be negotiated within this kind of setting of civic education. The vision of *pluralism*, however, indicates one possibility for how this might be achieved. The task for the teacher of civic education would then be to foster commitments while arguing for a persistent openness towards the other.

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